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Abstract: This study aims to investigate the the effect of corporate governance on financial 
statement frauds. The variables of the corporate governance consists of independent Board 
of Commisioners (IND), managerial ownership (OSHIP), audit committee meeting (MEET) 
and quality of external auditor (AUD). Agency theory was employed to explain how such 
variables may influence financial statement frauds. Population of this study was companies 
listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchanges (IDX) which were suspected for being involved in 
financial statement frauds from 2008 to 2012. Total sample were 38 companies, consisting 
of 19 companies which were penalised by the IDX regulator because of their potential 
fraudulent financial statement, and 19 companies that are not financial statements fraudsters 
from the same industry (sectors). Data were then analised using logistic regression method. 
The findings of this study indicated that audit committee meeting (MEET) significantly 
influenced financial statement frauds. Meanwhile, independent Board of Commisioners 
(IND), managerial ownership (OSHIP) and interaction of quality of external auditor (AUD) 
and audit committee meeting (MEET) have no significant impact on financial statement 
frauds. 
 
Keywords: financial statement frauds, corporate governance, agency theory, indonesia 
stock exchanges. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Financial statement frauds have been seen as interesting phenemona that have attracted 
accounting scholars to investigate. Indeed, a number of companies were committed to frauds by 
manipulating financial statements to mislead stakeholders. Fraudulent financial statements have 
been associated with corporate governance. According to Dechow (cited by Skousen et al., 
2009) the highest incidence of frauds in companies is related to weak corporate governance. A 
number of frauds occurred at the company with board dominated by insider parties and likely 
did not have an audit committee (Dechow et al. in Skousen et al., 2009). 
Frauds can take place in companies where there is a separation between the ownership 
of the company and its management (Meutia, 2004). Good corporate governance is required to 
reduce the agency problem between owners and managers (Ritonga, 2014). 
Studies  regarding corporate governance and fraudulent financial statements have been 
conducted  in a numbers of countries especially in developed countries but the studies have 
resulted in inconsistent findings (see Chen et al., 2006; Beasley, 1996; Jackson, 2009). As the 
fact that such studies have been done in different countries with different environment, it is 
necessary to invetigate the similar issues in Indonesia. This study aimed to analyze the influence 
of corporate governance:  the proportion of independent board, managerial ownership, the 
number of audit committee meetings and the quality of the external auditor on fraudulent 
financial statements. 
Studying corporate governance and fraudulent financial statement cannot be separated 
from agency theory e. Messier et al. (2006) claim that agency relationship raises two issues: (1) 
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The occurrence of asymmetric information, ie management generally has more information than 
the owner, (2) The occurrence of a conflict of interest due to the inequality of the goal, where 
management does not always act in the interests of the owners.  
Asymmetric information may mislead the users of  financial statements  in the decision 
making process. The increasing asymmetry of information between the manager (agent) with 
the owner (principal), push the adverse action such as fraud or earning manipulation in financial 
reporting. Such actions are a result of the conflict of interest and asymmetric information with 
the owner. Rezaee (2002) stated that actual earnings management is closely related to financial 
statement fraud. Based on these descriptions, it can be concluded that the agency problem 
between owners (principal) and management (agent) can trigger a financial statement fraud that 
may mislead stakeholders. 
 
Independent Board of Commissioner and Fraudulent Financial Statement. 
Information asymmetry between managers and owners could lead to fraud. To prevent 
potential frauds in the company, a company needs an oversight body to play roles in monitoring 
manager behaviour. Thus, in any companies, it is necessary to have independent board of 
commissioners to prevent frauds. The independent board of commissioners have trustworthy 
and is responsible for overseeing the daily business operations, including policies made by 
management (Chen et al., 2006). The presence of independent board is expected to minimize 
fraudulent financial statements. Members of commissioners coming from the outside companies 
is believed to conduct more independent oversight than insiders. This encourages a more 
effective supervision of the company so that the opportunity to commit fraud can be reduced. 
Research by Dechow et al. (1996) showed that frauds are more common in companies that have 
fewer independent boards of commissioners (Skousen et. al., 2009). 
 
H1: The proportion of independent board of commissioner negatively influences on 
fraudulent financial statements 
Managerial Ownership and Fraudulent Financial Statement 
Managerial ownership shows the proporsion of shares owned by insiders. Ownership of 
shares by insiders can considered as a policy to solve agency problems, as managerial 
ownership will align the interests of management to the interests of shareholders as w whole. 
Management policies expressed in in term of company's financial performance can be affected 
by the number of shares possesed by the insiders. Consequently, manager will make any 
decisions that increase firm values and will be more tranparent in presenting financial 
information. In other words, managers will works on the best interest of principals.  Study by 
Chen et al. (2006) indicated that the higher the percentage of managerial ownership, then the the 
lower the fraudulent financial statement.  
 
H2: Managerial ownership negatively affects fraudulent financial statements 
Audit Committe Meeting and Fraudulent Financial Statement 
The audit committee plays important role in assisting the board of commissioners 
especially in supervisory duties of financial reporting. The committe helps prevent agency 
problems as a result of differences in interests between the principal and agent. The audit 
committee may show their role in supervising financial reporting through regular meetings. The 
more intenstive meeting will enable the committee to minimize the opportunity for managers to 
manipulate financial reporting. Beasley et al. (1996) found that audit committees of companies 
committed to fraud has less meeting (once a year). Abbott et al. (2000) claimed that the audit 
committee meeting arranged at least twice a year would be associated with a decrease in the 
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possibility of frauds. Consequently, the more the meeting of audir committee the lesser the 
possibility of financial statement frauds (Jackson, 2009).  
H3: The number of audit committee meetings have negative influence on fraudulent 
financial statements 
Interaction of External Auditor Quality and Audit Committee Meeting  
An external Auditor is part of corporate governance that plays important roles in 
controlling the behavior of management. External auditors may interact with committee audit to 
supervise financial reporting. Such ineraction may prevent and detect the possibility of  frauds, 
especially financial statement frauds  (Chen et al, 2006). The involvement of external auditors 
may  help the effectiveness of audit committee meetings in minimizing fraud. The quality of the 
external auditor in detecting frauds can help the audit committee to follow up any audit findings 
so as to prevent or detect fraud occurring. Thus, the interaction of external auditor and the audit 
committee can reduce the level of fraud. The external auditors may strengthen the effect of audit 
committee meetings on fraudulent financial statement. 
 
H4: Interaction of external auditor quality and the number of audit committee meetings 
has negative influence on fraudulent financial statements. 
 
METHODS 
Fraudulent financial statements were measured by dummy variables categorized into 
two: code 1 (one) for firms fraud based on reports from the Financial Services Authority (OJK) 
describing the companies that were considered as fraudulent because they broke regulation of 
Bapepam (now Financial Service Authority /OJK) Number VIII.G.7 about presentation and 
disclosure of financial statements of listed companies and otherwise  code 0 (zero). The 
proportion of independent commissioners (IND) was measured using a total independent 
commissioners divided by total commissioners. Measurement of managerial ownership 
(OSHIP) is based on total insider owrnership divided by total outstanding  shares. Number of 
audit committee meetings were measured by the total number of audit committee meetings 
(MEET). Finally, the quality external auditors (AUD) is proxied by dummy variables, the value 
of 1 if the company is audited by a large accounting firm (PwC, KPMG, Deloitte and EY), and 
0 if other. 
Companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (BEI) 2008 – 2012 were used as 
population. Sample was determined based  on purposive sampling method with the following 
criteria:  
1. Non financial sector companies having required data on annual reports from 2008 to 
2012,  
2. Companies categorized by OJK violated the rules Number VIII.G.,  
3. Companies classified as a non fraud were used as pairs and taken from the same 
industries having assets approaching or almost the same as the fraudulent companies 
Data were analised using logistic regression with the folllowing equation: 
Ln ( p / 1 - p ) = α - β1INDt - β2OSHIPt - β3MEETt - β4AUDt - β5AUDt*MEETt + e  
 
Ln ( p / 1 - p ) = Companies with Fraudulent Financial Statement (1) and 0 (zero) for others 
INDt = proportion of independent board of commissioners 
OSHIPt = proportion of managerial ownership  
MEETt = the number of audit committee meetings  
AUDt = dummy variables, code 1 (one) for Big Four Audit Firms, code 0 ( zero ) for the 
other 
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RESULT AND  DISCUSSION 
Based on the report from OJK (Financial Services Authority) 2008-2012, a sample of 
19 companies committed to frauds and 19 non-faruds can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Fraud and Non-Fraud Companies 
Industry Fraud Non Fraud Percentage 
Agriculture - - - 
Mining 5 5 26, 32% 
Basic Industry and Chemicals 5 5 26,32% 
Miscellaneous Industry 1 1 5,26% 
Consumer Goods Industry - - - 
Property, Real Estate and Building 
Construction 3 3 15,79% 
Infrastructure, Utilities and Transport 1 1 5,26% 
Trade, Services and Investment 4 4 21,05% 
Total 19 19 100% 
 
The companies were then classified into the number of companies based on the years of fraud 
occurence as reported in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Fraud and Non Fraud Companies by Years 
Years Fraud Non Frauds 
2008 3 3 
2009 4 4 
2010 7 7 
2011 2 2 
2012 3 3 
Total 19 19 
 
Based on Table 2, it can be seen that the companies committed to faudulent financial statement 
tended to increase from 2008 to 2010 and decrease in 2011, then decreased in 2011 . Details 
variables can be seen on Table 3 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Fraud Non Fraud 
Mean St. Deviation Mean St. Deviation 
Independent 
Commissioner 0.3800 0.0873 0.3747 0.0826 
Manageial 
Ownership 0.1034 0.2703 0.0036 0.0100 
Audit Committe 
Meeting 5.16 3.404 10.89 9.944 
 
Table 3 reported that fraud companies, on avarege, had proportion of independent 
commissioners of 38.00 % , while non-fraud companies had 37.47 %. Fraud companies had 
greater managerial ownership, around 10.34 %, compared to 3,6% non-frad companies. Finally, 
on average, fraud companies held around 5 meeting during a year wherease non-fraud 
companies had higher audit committee meeting (around 11 time a year) 
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Table 4 
External Auditor Quality: Fraud and Non Fraud 
   Company 
Total 
   Non fraud Fraud 
AUD Non Big 4 Count 12 17 29 
% within 
FRAUD 63.2% 89.5% 76.3% 
Big 4 Count 7 2 9 
% within 
FRAUD 36.8% 10.5% 23.7% 
Total Count 19 19 38 
% within 
FRAUD 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 4 showed that nine companies or only 23.7 % of the total sample were audited by the Big 
4 and the others (76.23%) were audited by Non-Big 4. Fraud Companies  (10.5 %) are audited 
by a Big 4 accounting firm, while non-fraud companies (36.8 %) were audited by Big 4. 
Based on goodness of fit test, it can be sen that the significant value of Hosmer and 
Lemeshow was 0.563. As the value is greater than the significant level α = 5 %, thus, this value 
implied that the logistic regression model can be used to analyze the predictive model of the 
companies which commit to fraudulent financial statements. The results of hypothesis test can 
be seen in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Hypothesis Test 
Variable Significant Value (α = 
5%) 
Independent Board of Commissioner 0.581 
Managerial Ownership 0.233 
Audit Committee Meeting   0.019* 
Quality of External Auditor 0.511 
Interaction of Quality of External Auditor and Audit 
Committee Meeting 
0.375 
Note: Significant at 5% 
 
The result of the first hypothesis test showed that independent board of commissioner 
didnot significanty affect financial statement fraud with a significance value of 0.581. This 
implies that the number of independent commissioner do not effectively reduce fraudulent 
financial statements of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The 
establishment of independent commissioner in the companies is only done to meet the 
regulations of Good Corporate Governance. Indeed, it is compulsory for companies listed in the 
IDX to have  independent commissioners at least 30 % ( thirty percent ) of all commissioners . 
The results of this study are supported by study by Zulfiqar et al. (2009 ) which states that 
independent boards do not adversely affect fraud management measures (earnings 
management). 
The second hypothesis test also indicated that managerial ownership didnot negatively 
affect the financial statement fraud with a significance value of 0.233. The more shares owned 
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by the insiders cannnot prevent the likelyhood of fraudulent financial statements. This finding 
didnot support agency theory claims that insider ownership can be used as media to supervise 
manager behavior.  Sukartha (2007) claims that the greater managerial ownership, the more 
likely the managers to fulfill the interest of principals including intention to commit frauds. In 
fact, executives who have personal financial interest can threaten the company financial 
performance (Beasley, 1996) . 
The third hypothesis test of the relationship of audit committee meeting and fraudulent 
financial statement was supported. This finding implied that the number of audit committee 
meetings negatively affect fraudulent financial statement (significant value of 0.019). Indeed, 
the increasing surveillance and control through audit committee meeting reduce conflict of 
interest between principal and agent. Routine audit committee meetings enable the members of 
audit committee to continuously oversee financial reporting process. The interactive 
communication established at the meeting enables audit committee, external auditors, managers 
and internal auditors, to minimize the possibility of frauds. The results of this study support 
findings of Owens et al.  (2009) that the frequency of audit committee meetings have negatively 
affect the possibility of fraudulent financial reporting . 
The fourth hypothesis test on the role of external auditor quality in moderating the 
relationship of audit committee meeting and fianncial ststement frauds was not supported. This 
indicated that the quality of interaction of external auditors and the number of audit committee 
meetings did not affect the financial statement fraud (significant  value of 0.375) ).  
Communication established at a meeting of the audit committee with external auditors or 
managers or internal auditors does not play roles in reducing the level of fraud earlie. This may 
happen as the fact that auditors deter fraud in the company by means of detection of potential 
fraud and then suggest a revision or restatement of financial statements (Chen et al , 2006). If 
the external auditors find something that is not in accordance with generally acceptable 
accounting standards and is related to frauds, but the company does not want to follow the 
suggestions for improving the presentation of financial statements because of different interests, 
the financial statement fraud may still occur. This finding was consistent with claims by Becker 
et al. (1998) that the demands of reducing fraud management can not be influenced by the 
public accounting firm and audit committee meetings. 
 
CONCLUSION  
The findings of this study claims that several factors of corpoate governance may 
influence financial statement fraud. Of the four factors studied (the proportion of independent 
board, managerial ownership, audit committee meetings and interaction of the external auditors 
quality and audit committee meeting), only number of audit committee meetings positively 
influenced financial statement fraud. This implies that the more audit committee meetings held, 
the more effective supervision so as to minimize the potential financial statement fraud. While 
other variables, the proportion of independent board, managerial ownership and interaction of 
external auditor quality and audit committee meeting did not affect fraudulent financial 
statement. 
Limitation of this study is related to the availability of sample (small sample size) as the 
fact that data of company committed to financial statement frauds were only 19. Data of such 
companies can only be obtained from a report by the Financial Services Authority (OJK). To 
increase data, future research may consider the use of Beneish Ratio as measurement to 
determine companies which are potentially committed to frauds. The future research may also 
include other factors such as firm characteristics (financial distress, leverage, profitability and 
othe ownership types) as determinants of financial statement frauds 
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